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Abstract
Religion is a major cultural, social, political, and economic factor in many official 
development assistance (ODA) recipient countries and understanding religious dynamics 
and the role of faith communities and actors is crucial for sustainable development. 
While faith communities have endured and thrived the world over, a wave of modernist, 
secular social change dominated development practice and discourse from the second 
half of the 20th century. It was assumed that religion had become outdated and would 
eventually disappear. However, faith communities, actors, and assets continue to occupy 
a critical space. Accordingly, development discourse and practice have seen a new wave 
indicating a turn to recognizing the significant role of religion. 
Many faith actors have also been involved in development policy, including a 
commitment to join the global collaboration around achieving the new Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Two factors underpin this paper. First, the process to 
decide the SDGs involved the largest civil society consultation ever held in the UN’s 
history. Second, over the past decade or so increased attention has been paid to the 
collaboration between faith actors and secular global development actors. Considering 
these two factors we wanted to better understand the role that faith actors are playing in 
the SDG process. The paper is based upon findings from a research project funded by 
the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)— “Keeping Faith in 2030: 
Religions and the SDGs”—that has been led by the three authors of this paper. 
Introduction
Religion is a major cultural, social, political, and economic factor in many official development 
assistance (ODA) recipient countries, and understanding religious dynamics and the role of faith 
communities and actors is crucial for sustainable development. While faith communities have 
endured and thrived the world over, a wave of modernist, secular social change dominated 
development practice and discourse from the second half of the 20th century. It was assumed that 
religion had become outdated and would eventually disappear. However, faith communities, 
actors, and assets continue to occupy a critical space. A Pew Research Centre study found that in 
2012, 8 in 10 people still identify with a religion (2012). Accordingly, global development 
discourse and practice has seen a new wave indicating a turn to recognizing the significant role 
of religion. Greater portions of development aid are now channeled via faith-based initiatives or 
organizations, and religion is increasingly recognized as a human resource rather than an 
obstacle to development. 
Many faith actors have also been involved in development policy, initially by adopting and 
heralding the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and more recently through a 
commitment to join the global collaboration around achieving the new Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). The SDGs comprise 17 goals with 169 targets that were signed by the 193 UN 
member states in 2015. They have replaced the MDGs, which ran from 2000-2015, and are part 
of a broader Agenda 2030, reflecting the aim that they should be achieved by the year 2030. The 
MDGs had been unilaterally set within the UN with little to no consultation with civil society. 
By contrast, the SDGs were arrived at following a wide-reaching negotiation process within the 
UN as well as the largest civil society consultation ever held in its history, made possible via the 
use of the www.worldwewant2015.org website. It was documented that over seven million 
people took part in the survey up to the end of 2014 (Dodds et al 2017). The MDGs were also 
perceived by many as a top-down Global North to Global South exercise, whereas the SDGs 
apply equally and contain goals and targets for countries of the Global North and South. The 
SDGs also seek to ensure a more grassroots and locally owned type of development based on the 
recognition that “local people” are better placed to both understand and respond to development 
challenges. Since local societies in development aid recipient countries are often centred around 
faith communities, the engagement and role played by them becomes even more critical to the 
discussion on sustainable development. 
In the consultation process as well as the implementation phase, there has been a coordinated 
effort from within the UN to engage with civil society actors, including those who are faith-
based. The UN inter-agency task force on engaging faith-based actors for sustainable 
development played a leading role in this engagement (see Box 1) (Karam 2014, 2016). 
Although the MDGs made progress on some development indicators, they proved less suitable 
for reducing inequality (Dodds et al 2017). A central commitment of the SDGs is to make sure 
that no-one is “left behind,” which in essence seeks to support a more inclusive approach to 
development that ensures the poorest and most marginalized do not lose out. Following the SDG 
consultation process, which began after the Rio+20 conference in 2012 and re-established “the 
sustainable development narrative at the global level,” states, civil society, and the private sector 
have been increasingly involved in approaches and methods towards implementing the goals 
(Dodds et al 2017). For example, many civil society actors participate in the annual UN High-
Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development meetings, and states are carrying out country 
level consultations to decide national indicators for the SDGs, as well as putting in place 
initiatives to collect relevant data so as to measure progress.
This paper explores the role of faith actors in the SDG process to date, including the 
consultations to set the SDGs as well as the implementation phase. It is based upon findings from 
a research project funded by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)—“Keeping 
Faith in 2030: Religions and the SDGs”—that has been led by the three authors of this paper.1 
Considering the increased attention that has been paid to the collaboration between faith actors 
and secular global development actors over the past decade or so (Rakodi 2015), we wanted to 
better understand the role that faith actors are playing in the SDG process. This project has 
involved three main in the UK, India, and Ethiopia workshops (Birmingham in February 2017,  
New Delhi in December 2017, Ethiopia in September 2018).. A final conference was held at 
SOAS in February 2019, which also included the launch of our project report at the Westminster 
Houses of Parliament in a joint event with the All Parliamentary Group on Faith and Society.1 
The workshops have involved representatives from FBOs (alongside other NGOs and 
academics) who have reflected upon their engagement to date with the SDG process. Notes from 
the various discussions at the workshops already held, along with the transcripts from ten key 
informant interviews, form the data that we draw upon in this paper. 
As outlined in Box 2, the broad category of “faith actor” extends beyond the formal faith-based 
organizations (FBOs) that are most visible within the global development world. While this 
project has focused on the role of such FBOs in the SDG process we will also comment on the 
role of other types of faith actor, including religious leaders. 
The first section discusses three phases of the engagement across religions and global 
development:2the colonial period when religion and development efforts were ideologically 
entwined in the Christian “civilizing mission”; 
1. the era of the secular global development industry in the post-World War II period where the significant 
role that religion continued to play in local level development and humanitarianism3 was marginalized in 
development studies and political processes; and the “turn to religion” by global development policy and 
practice from the early 2000s. 
The second section outlines the SDG process from its emergence after the Rio+20 Conference in 
2012 and the setting of the goals in August 2015, through to the current implementation and 
monitoring phase.
Section three looks more specifically at the contribution of faith actors to the SDG process, 
drawing on our research from the ‘Keeping Faith in 2030: Religions and the SDGs’ project. It 
examines structures within the UN to engage faith actors as well as how faith actors themselves 
have taken the SDGs into their work and what this means for them. In this section we ask: 
 Were faith actors involved in the consultation to set the goals, and if so which faith actors and what has 
their contribution been? 
 How are they beginning to interpret and implement the SDGs? 
 Are there any SDGs that pose a challenge for some faith actors and why might that be? 
 What should be the role of both faith and secular development and humanitarian actors in mitigating 
such challenges? 
The paper ends with a set of recommendations for governments and NGOs.
1 The final report and policy recommendation can be downloaded at 
https://religions-and-development.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2019/02/Policy-Paper-for-web.pdf
Religion and Global Development
Phase one: the colonial period
Religious traditions have always played a central role in supporting those experiencing poverty 
and marginalization, through service delivery as well as the provision of spiritual resources that 
provide mechanisms for resilience at both the individual and community level. Sometimes these 
interventions were limited to those within one’s own religion, but often people extended support 
to those from other religions or understood it as an essential part of their religious commitment to 
combine their religious outreach with relief and development efforts. This was a particularly 
marked phenomenon within the Christian missionary movement which accompanied European 
colonialism from the nineteenth century onward, from early abolitionist activism and the slogan 
of “Christianity and commerce” to the “civilising” ideology and the provision of essential 
services in health and education as colonialism took root.4 Colonial and missionary interests did 
not always align and were at times even marked by conflict, but the Christian “civilizing 
mission” formed a pathway for colonialism and provided it with an important ideological 
justification in Europe by casting colonial efforts as a service in development.In this way, 
Christian mission and abolitionism were at the root of modern ideas of global development, and 
other religions in the colonies were judged on their compatibility with this “civilizing” project 
(Haustein and Tomalin 2017). This sparked “modernizing” movements within some religions, 
where some reformers asserted their compliance with European social and economic visions, 
while others used the process of reform to resist and critique colonization (Haustein and Tomalin 
2017, 81). Moreover, religious institutions became key providers of the welfare services which 
functioned as crucial indicators of the “civilizing” project, providing health care, education, 
vocational training, as well as local information and advocacy. Complementing the failures and 
needs of the colonial economy in rapidly transitioning contexts, they in many ways occupied the 
same structural position that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have today (Manji and 
O’Coill 2002). This was not only limited to Christian actors, local religious institutions occupied 
similar spaces in their engagement with the colonial state and the wider public (Haustein and 
Tomalin 2017, 82).
Phase 2: the marginalization of religion from development 
Despite this strong association of religion with development and welfare provision during the 
colonial period, the emergence of a new bipolar world order after WWII brought about 
fundamental changes in the configuration of the global economy and its narratives about 
inequality, especially as the USA and its competition with Russia displaced the waning colonial 
powers (Haustein and Tomalin 2017). The American post-War development project at first 
inherited much of the rhetoric of the Christian “civilizing” mission as is evident in Truman’s 
famous Point 4 Speech, but also in the continued presence of missionary actors and an 
understanding about the role of religion in orienting development. However, with the 
increasingly evident rise of secularism in the Global North and the emerging secularization 
theories, religion was soon ignored in Western development policies and theories, or given a 
broad value-orienting position at best. In this way a secularist position took hold of the global 
development industry, claiming implicitly or explicitly that modernization will and indeed 
should lead to secularization and that religions are outdated and likely to act against development 
and progress. Within development studies and practice, this has marginalized the significant role 
that religion continued to play in local level development globally as well as forgetting the roots 
of Western led global development during the colonial missionary era. 
Phase 3: the “turn to religion” by development 
While modern global development discourses from the 1960s onward thus have tended to be 
secular in nature and to pay little attention to people’s religious values and identities, over the 
past decade or so there has been an apparent “turn to religion” in development studies, policy, 
and practice (see  Box 1) (Rakodi 2015). This reflects the realization that modernization and 
secularization do not necessarily go hand-in-hand and that religious values and faith actors are 
important determinants in the drive to reduce poverty as well as in the structures and practices 
that underpin it. The political tailwinds for this turn can be linked back to American debates 
about the role of faith-based and community initiatives in the delivery of state welfare. During 
his first term in office, George W. Bush used a number of executive orders to harness the 
capacity of community and faith-based initiatives to this end, which also changed the position of 
USAID on cooperation with faith actors. Since the early 2000s, and continuing through the 
SDGs, there has been a marked increase in interest from secular global development institutions 
in funding and working with faith actors around poverty reduction and humanitarian relief, and 
the concept of faith-based organizations (FBOs) arose in this very context. It is important to note, 
however, that this “turn to religion” has more relevance in the Global North than South, since in 
many settings in the Global South, secularism never took hold or was not as widespread as in the 
North, and religion has continued to shape development values and practical solutions to 
development-related challenges. 
Critiques of the “turn to religion” 
While many faith and secular development actors consider that the “turn to religion” is a 
progressive move, others have been critical. Global development institutions are still, on the 
whole, dominated by secularist approaches and considerations of religion, and the contribution of 
faith actors are still a long way off being “mainstreamed” in the way that gender analysis has 
been. Some are wary of engaging with religious institutions and faith actors, suspicious that their 
interest in development and humanitarianism is being used to mask attempts of proselytism. 
Other critics are concerned that an inherent conservatism and sectarianism within many faith 
communities will inevitably clash with certain development goals, such as gender equality (SDG 
5) or peace and inclusion (SDG 16) and assert that universal human rights are better pursued on 
secular routes.
Given the long history of the interplay between Western ideas about religion and development 
ideology, it is important to recognize that religion, like other approaches including secularism, 
cannot be a panacea to solve development problems. The presumed advantages of FBOs, for 
instance, can sometimes be overstated and essentialized. Strong discourses have emerged around 
FBOs having a “comparative advantage” over secular NGOs, including that they are trusted by 
the poor and understand their worldview, and carry out development efficiently (and cheaply) as 
they have a ready pool of donors and volunteers. While FBOs are today sometimes viewed as the 
“forgotten factor” (Selinger 2004), marginalized from mainstream development due to the 
secular focus of the Western development agenda, their presumed advantages do not always 
guarantee success nor reflect reality (Tomalin 2012). The very category of FBO itself as 
distinguishable from NGOs has been queried particularly in countries where religious affiliations 
and motivations run right through NGOs as well. Often, FBOs have learned to state their goals in 
non-religious language (Tomalin 2012). 
Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made to support the view that unless development policy 
and practice takes religion seriously, both in terms of how religious traditions still prevail across 
much of the world, as well as the significant contribution that faith actors make to the 
development and humanitarian field, then efforts are likely to be met with limited success. This 
requires careful consideration of when to engage and when not to engage, and of knowing where 
religion might be particularly relevant as a strategy or resource to improve people’s lives. 
Some faith actors have also been critical of the “turn to religion” arguing that it has not gone far 
enough. They argue that their resources and social capital have been instrumentalized by global 
development institutions to achieve a secular development model rather than one that is more 
human-centred and takes the human relationship with the divine seriously. Also, while global 
development institutions are taking religion more seriously, they often choose to partner with 
FBOs that look like themselves. This formal FBO sector consists of organizations which operate 
(at least in their public facing persona) like any other international non-governmental 
organization (INGO) and express their religion “passively” or do not bring it to the table at all.5 
Therefore, the “turn to religion” risks missing out on what might be distinctive about the ways 
that religion shapes everyday values and practices as well as on the contribution of much faith-
based activity at the local level, including in places of worship and the congregations of 
charismatic religious leaders (Clarke and Jennings 2008; Tomalin 2018).The SDG framework
The emergence of the post-2015 agenda
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were the outcome of several years of discussion 
and negotiation, hosted by the UN, that began in 2012 as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) were reaching their cut-off date of 2015. The SDGs, writes Fukuda-Parr “are a major 
departure from the MDGs. They differ not just in the number of goals and targets, but in their 
very purpose, conception, and the political process that drove their elaboration” (Fukuda-Parr 
2016). A mandate for the SDGs as a global set of goals for sustainable development that apply 
equally to all countries emerged after the Rio+20 conference in June 2012 and an 
intergovernmental Open Working Group (OWG) was set up to deliberate and outline the goals. 
Parallel to this, the UN Secretary General launched a High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons to 
guide the discussions about the Post-2015 agenda and these “combined over time to elaborate the 
declaration to be adopted at the 2015 General Assembly, encompassing both the agenda and the 
goals” (Fukuda-Parr 2016, 45).
The SDG-OWG had 30 seats, which were shared by a group of 70 member state representatives. 
It operated between March 2013 and July 2014 and came up with the draft 17 goals and 169 
targets. It was chaired by the Permanent Representatives of Hungary and Kenya, Ambassadors 
Csaba Körösi and Macharia Kamau. In addition to the involvement of member states, the OWG 
also included mechanisms for the Major Groups and other Stakeholders (MGoS) to be consulted 
between March-November 2013 on 26 themes that could become the subject of an SDG. 
The role of civil society actors in the consultation process
While there was a role for civil society actors in the OWG consultations, the Rio+20 Conference 
had also agreed that both thematic and regional consultations would be held prior to the SDG-
OWG to feed into the negotiations. This consultation process aimed to reach a wide range of 
stakeholders, including governments, NGOs, the private sector, media, universities, think tanks 
and the general public. The SDG-OWG completed its work in July 2014 and in October 2014 
Ambassador David Donoghue of Ireland and Ambassador Macharia Kamau were appointed as 
co-facilitators of the intergovernmental negotiations that would finalize the post 2015 
development agenda and to produce the text of Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. These negotiations ran from December 2014 to August 2015 and 
involved all 193 member states as well as structures for input from MGoS.
Although the SDG consultation process claimed to be the largest ever held in the UN’s history 
and gathered the views of a wide range of stakeholders in many different parts of the globe, there 
was also criticism that the consultation did not extend as far as it could have done and that the 
negotiations were biased in the favour of state inputs. It was, however, a considerable 
improvement on the MDG selection process, meaning that governments and civil society actors 
were likely to feel more committed to the SDGs. Moreover, the fact that they are global in nature 
and that they aim to directly tackle inequality is of great appeal to those in the Global South. 
Faith actors and the SDGs
Keeping in mind that the category of “faith actor” is broader than the formal FBOs that have 
tended to be the focus of the “turn to religion” by global development institutions so far (see Box 
2), in this section we look at UN structures for engaging faith actors with the SDG process as 
well as how faith actors themselves have engaged with the SDGs, via the UN or otherwise. 
UN structures for engaging faith actors with the SDG process
The UNFPA has been the main space within the UN where religious engagement has been 
nurtured and it now has decades of experience working with faith-based organizations, with 
several publications that explore the role of religion and culture in its work (UNFPA 2005, 2007, 
2008). It has been at the forefront of efforts to mainstream considerations of religion throughout 
UN agencies. It was part of a new initiative beginning in 2007 and formalized by 2009, the UN 
Inter Agency Task Force (UNIATF) on Religion and Development (see Box 1) (Karam  2014, 
2016) and in 2009 produced Guidelines for Engaging Faith-Based Organizations as Cultural 
Agents of Change (UNFPA 2009). Other work in this area includes producing reports on the 
UNIATF’s engagement with faith actors (UNFPA 2014, 2016, 2018). More recently this body, 
now known as the UN Interagency Task Force on Engaging Religion for Sustainable 
Development, has played a role in events and publications concerned with bringing faith actors 
into the new SDG process (Karam 2014, 2016). This included an event during the final stages of 
the SDG-OWG consultation process – Religion and Development Post-2015 – held 12th-14th May 
2014 in New York (Karam 2014). The participants at this Donor-UN-FBO (DUF) Roundtable 
then became the nucleus of PaRD, which formed in 2016 (see Box 1). 
Since the SDGs were set, the UNIATF on Engaging Religion for Sustainable Development is 
supporting joint activities across UN agencies, as well as reporting on what different UN 
agencies are doing (UNFPA 2016, 2018). This involves engagement with formal FBOs linked to 
the UN system as well as local faith actors in different countries.
However, on the whole, the negotiation processes to decide the SDGs involved faith actors as 
civil society actors, so that their religious identity did not make an obvious difference. As one 
interviewee who was involved in the final negotiations told us: 
Within the NGOs, how visible were faith groups, I'm asking myself. I honestly 
couldn't say that they were that visible, that’s not to say that they weren’t there 
but I have a clearer sense of the faith community as it were from a couple of side 
events, which I addressed around that time.6It appears that there was little 
attempt to engage faith actors as a distinct stakeholder group in the main SDG 
process. None of the faith actors that we have spoken to felt that there was a 
space to bring in a discussion of anything “religious” (e.g. relating to theology or 
religious beliefs) into the public facing SDG process. However, neither did many 
articulate a need to do so, preferring rather to use the SDG framework as a way 
to protect their rights and gain equal treatment. In our discussions in India and in 
Ethiopia we found a similar sentiment. Keeping overt religious language out of 
the SDG process and ensuring a religiously neutral space for development policy 
was felt to be important in a setting where religiously based conflict and tension 
is prominent. 
Some opportunities to take part in events and sessions more focussed on religious engagement 
specifically did exist as part of the SDG consultation process, including those organized by the 
UNIATF on Engaging Religion for Sustainable Development. However, another interviewee 
warned that when faith groups are treated as a separate group of stakeholders and meetings are 
set up to cater for their needs and input they then can become siloed and “the consultations, the 
capacity building, the knowledge management… and the policy advocacy takes place 
separately.”7This highlights the fact that faith actors, in the same way as other civil society 
actors, interact in a range of forums where they use a different language and ways of engaging 
according to the character of other participants. While many faith actors deliberately maintain a 
“secular” persona in their public engagement with the SDGs, they are at the same time able to 
also engage with local faith communities in terms of religious language and concepts where 
appropriate. 
The engagement of faith actors with the SDGs8 Despite these global structural issues in the 
consultation process, faith actors all over the world actively engage with the SDGs and their 
local implementation. In order to find out more specifically what their perspectives and 
approaches to the SDGs are, our workshops consisted of a series of discussion activities formed 
around four main questions. Our workshops held in Birmingham (February 2017), New Delhi 
(December 2017), and Addis Ababa (September 2018) yield a number of interesting insights 
with regard to faith actors around their engagement in the SDG process. We present them here 
sorted according to four main questions which were central to our workshop activities.
1) Did you participate in the consultation process to set the SDGs?
In the Birmingham workshop, participants (who were mainly representatives from the first type 
of “faith actor” outlined in Box 2) did not feel that there had been a particular effort by the UN to 
consult FBOs and other faith actors about the SDGs and instead they had been actively 
“knocking at the door” to have their say. The FBOs who had been involved in the consultation 
tended to be those who were already “at the table,” who were funded and involved in UN 
networks, and there was little successful attempts, or perhaps not far-reaching enough attempts, 
to engage with a wider cohort of faith actors. These FBOs were involved more as INGOs than as 
faith actors per se. In other words, the fact that they were faith-based was not the reason for them 
being included, but rather incidental. They also noted that the faith actors who were involved in 
the consultation process were mainly Christian and that there were very few non-Christian FBOs 
represented. It was also highlighted that the very discourse on the SDGs was highly Christian. 
For example, Pope Francis has had a large impact on debates through his encyclical Laudato si.9 
In New Delhi, our participants (who were mainly representatives from the first and second types 
of “faith actor” outlined in Box 2) mostly reported that they were unaware that the consultations 
were going on. The national consultations in India had not specifically reached out to faith 
actors, including religious leaders and organizations, and where faith actors did engage (e.g. via 
the civil society coordinating group Wada Na Todo Abhiyan) they did so as civil society actors.
In Ethiopia, none of the assembled organisations had participated in any kind of national or 
international consultation about the SDGs, with the exception of one academic who had been 
part of a subject-specific consultation. Others had only heard about SDG consultations through 
their international headquarters, but had not been involved in them in any way. For the most part, 
the SDG agenda was something that only gradually showed up on the radar of Ethiopian FBOs 
and NGOs, and for some participants our workshop was their first serious engagement with the 
SDGs.
2) To what extent and in what ways are you now beginning to interpret and implement the SDGs 
in your work? Have they changed what you do? 
In New Delhi a number of the participants had been involved in the subsequent consultations to 
set the national indicators for the SDGs, rather than the pre-2015 consultation process discussed 
in the section above. They participated in meetings organized by civil society actors and by the 
government, as well as inputting into the public consultation on the draft country level indicators. 
There was no indication that these faith actors were participating in ways that brought their 
religious identities and beliefs to the fore, although many said that this motivated them to act. 
Instead, their participation was as civil society actors who represent groups that are marginalized 
and belong to minority religious traditions in the country (e.g. Christianity, Buddhism, and 
Islam). There was a strong articulation from participants that the SDGs should be “secular” and 
that this was positive. In India the meaning of secular is nuanced to emphasize that something is 
relevant to all religious traditions rather than a religious perspective being absent or dismissed as 
unimportant. In a political climate where participants could face accusations of proselytization or 
anti-Hindu sentiment, the commitment to “secularism” is an important public value. 
In Ethiopia, by contrast, our participants did not report any involvement with the SDG 
implementation process either. Development policy and practice in Ethiopia is highly controlled 
by the state, which pursues its own national development agenda, laid out in five-year Growth 
and Transformation Plans (GTP). The current GTP II claims to “mainstream” the SDGs in the 
Ethiopian context, but actually pursues a much more narrowly defined development agenda with 
a primary focus on GDP and infrastructure growth. All development actors are accountable to 
the GTP, with their government consultations and reporting structured accordingly. While in 
international FBOs the SDG agenda was gradually beginning to influence their planning and 
reporting frameworks, this had not yet filtered down to the Ethiopian country offices. However, 
one country representative of an international FBO reported to us after the Addis Ababa 
workshop that they had now begun to reframe their planning and fundraising efforts around the 
SDGs.
In all three settings, our participants told us that the SDGs had not changed what they focused on 
in their work, as their planning was driven by their organisational visions, capacity, and the 
primary needs of their constituents. For some organisations, however, the SDGs had become a 
new way of articulating their activities. They had already redesigned leaflets and websites to 
express their key areas of activity in relation to the SDGs. Some organizations were beginning to 
organize events to sensitize local communities towards the SDGs, including what they could 
benefit from engaging with the framework. This local level work did involve some degree of 
articulating the SDGs in religious terms. Others, however, asked what the added benefit of the 
SDGs would be, since they only reflected – in quite unspecific language – what they had been 
doing for many years if not decades already.
3) If the SDGs have not significantly changed what you do, then what is their value for your 
work and for meeting development targets that will reduce inequality? 
In Birmingham and New Delhi, participants were already referring to the SDGs in funding 
applications in order to demonstrate the relevance of their work to this new global framework, 
and some were anticipating that the SDG framework would unlock additional funding sources. In 
the India workshop it was stressed that the SDG framework offers a way to connect local 
initiatives to international development discourse and to participate in global conversations, 
helping to align the purposes and goals of FBOs toward a common strategy and vision, and that 
it provides opportunities to collaborate and increase the impact of individual FBOs. Thus, 
participation in the SDGs provided them with an opportunity to articulate their work within the 
language of global development, which helped to gain acceptance and inclusion in some policy 
debates. Participants also felt that working within the international framework of the SDGs gives 
FBOs additional credibility, providing benchmarks by which their work can be assessed under 
professional criteria such that the quality of their activities can be demonstrated rather than just 
the fact that they exist (e.g. quality education). 
In India we also heard that especially for marginalized religious groups, the SDGs were seen as 
an important way to engage with the state and its uneven hand in programming and 
implementing development processes. In some cases, the framework was also proving to be an 
effective civil society building tool, which was enabling groups to coalesce around issues and to 
present a coherent set of demands to the government. One of our interview respondents 
explained that Muslims in India have many groups but that these are mostly “religious based 
groups or influenced by religion,” focussing on religious education rather than a broader set of 
development goals.10 International faith-based organizations were therefore playing an important 
role in India in demonstrating that there is “something which is going on in the outside world and 
we as a citizen of the country, need to engage” and that global frameworks can be used by 
minorities to leverage gains within their countries. The fact that the government was being 
compelled to create mechanisms for collecting disaggregated data, according to factors such as 
caste, religion, and gender, in order to monitor SDG progress effectively, was also seen as 
another potentially empowering aspect of the SDG framework, serving as a lobbying and 
advocacy tool. In the absence of such data it is difficult for marginalized groups to evidence their 
inequality. The SDGs play a dual role of being a framework for advocacy as well as for 
programming and resources.Mirroring some of these findings to our participants at the Ethiopia 
workshop, some agreed that the SDG framework might be helpful in agreeing universal 
standards and reporting mechanisms, while others agreed with the Ethiopian government’s 
approach of prioritising a national framework in development planning. Participants also saw 
potential for the SDGs becoming more relevant in the future with regard to their fundraising and 
communication. At the same time they saw two main challenges. Firstly, there was an absence of 
knowledge around the SDGs and a lack of capacity building in this area. Secondly, they also 
critiqued the absence of moral and ethical elements in the farming of the SDGs and targets, 
which runs counter to the “holistic” development approach of faith-based actors, which 
understands the discussion and improvement of communal and personal norms as an important 
component to achieving sustainable development.
4) Do any of the SDGs pose challenges to faith actors?
It has been reported that two of the most controversial SDGs to agree upon during the 
consultation process were 5 “gender equality” and 16 “peaceful and inclusive societies.” With 
respect to SDG 5, the reference to “women’s reproductive health and reproductive rights” (target 
5.6) had become controversial throughout the OWG and beyond with ‘divergent views aroused 
from differing ethical and religious perspectives” (Dodds et al 2017, 38). In fact, the language for 
target 5.6 was one of the last to be agreed in the final hours of the OWG. Similarly, SDG 16 was 
“possibly the most sensitive and controversial of all…[and]…considerable opposition to Goal 16 
remained until the last hours of the OWG” (Dodds et al 2017, 40). It was not faith actors 
opposing this goal. Instead its sensitivity was due to the perception that this goal more than 
others impacted upon national sovereignty and security concerns and that were viewed by some 
critics as lying outside the remit of the SDGs. However, religious dynamics play a role in 
conflict and insecurity, and therefore need to be part of the solution. 
These goals were also mentioned by our workshop participants as two of the goals that are 
potentially challenging for some faith actors, while being amongst the most important. We heard 
that some “conservative” faith actors find aspects of SDG 5 threatening for seeming to contradict 
certain norms about men and women’s roles, as well as for the perception that it fails to promote 
the proper place of sexual relationships as only being within heterosexual marriages. Both goal 
16 (peace and justice) and 17 (partnership for the goals) were also seen as difficult on account of 
religious particularisms sometimes getting in the way of dialogue and collaboration.
There was, however, an important point of difference between our UK and overseas workshops 
in assessing the consequences of these difficulties. In our Birmingham workshop, the 
international FBOs present pointed to likely doctrinal or ideological differences when assessing 
what goals might be difficult to implement with their overseas partners. By contrast,  most of our 
workshop participants in India and Ethiopia stressed that none of the goals were too difficult to 
adopt and integrate. Many were keen to demonstrate that they supported all of the goals and that 
any obstacles to the SDGs were not rooted in religious doctrine. Instead, they saw that many of 
the challenges to the SDGs were to do with culture rather than religious doctrine, for example in 
the case of stereotypes about gender inequality, which they asserted were rooted in culture rather 
than religious doctrine. Sustainable development therefore would require a more complex 
translation process that recognised the interconnectedness of religious and cultural norms and 
was better attuned to local conditions. Faith actors stressed that with their local expertise and 
networks as well as their exposure to international development language, they were particularly 
well-placed to facilitate such translation and transformation processes. Accordingly, some 
participants saw part of their role as demonstrating to communities that their religion supports 
equality and human rights in an attempt to reform negative attitudes that would undermine the 
SDGs. 
The reasons for this disparity point to likely tensions in international development cooperation, 
and more research on this point is needed. However, we suggest that international FBOs 
engaging with faith actors in the Global South should focus their dialogue on the specific 
challenges of “culture change” rather than doctrinal obstacles. In such dialogue they should 
suspend their focus on religious doctrine and explore what is considered to be the particular 
cultural difficulties in the implementation of an SDG and why, and how this might be overcome. 
Many FBOs already do this. Faith actors, including local FBOs and religious leaders, can be key 
allies in the process of culture change when they are in a position to demonstrate the ways in 
which the SDGs are supported by religious doctrine. However, it is important not to over-
emphasize or over-rely on the capacity of the same religious leaders to effect change and care 
must be taken to engage with various parts of the community including minorities and 
marginalized groups that might not be represented by religious or community leaders. 
From the point of view of secular development and humanitarian actors who encounter—or 
perceive that they encounter—obstacles to particular SDGs on the basis of differences in 
religious doctrine, two points are important here. First, it is likely be more effective to focus on 
the specific challenges of any particular SDG. Rather than focusing on the entire goal and 
making or accepting generalizations that any obstacles are due to doctrinal differences, it is 
helpful to realize that aspects of how gender equality, for example, is formulated in some targets 
of SDG 5 may be difficult for some within their religious communities. These precise points of 
tension need to be identified in order to work towards establishing common ground. There may 
be some areas that can never be agreed, but much progress can be made in others in partnership 
with local faith communities and actors. Second, objections to particular aspects of an SDG are 
in reality unlikely to be primarily to do with doctrine. Religious doctrine might be invoked to 
support or justify particular attitudes and behaviours, but this is unlikely to be the primary 
motivation since religious practice is about so much more than doctrine (e.g. ritual, belonging, 
heritage, pride, expectations etc.). Sometimes a distinction is made between religious doctrine 
and culture, with these additional features of religious practice being relegated to the sphere of 
culture rather than authentic doctrine as codified in sacred texts. This kind of distinction is 
analytically meaningless and does not help us to understand the dynamics of lived religion and 
its contextual understanding, which may be very different from that of the West.  
The assumption that the religious practice of individuals is dictated by their religious texts 
reflects one aspect of the Western “world religions paradigm,” where sacred texts are valued 
over vernacular “lived religion.” Another aspect of the “world religions paradigm” is that people 
can only belong to one, discrete religious tradition each of which may be differentiated by their 
religious texts and teachings. However, in many places the boundaries between religions are 
often not clear-cut, and people may appear to practice or belong to more than one at the same 
time. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa people often practice African Traditional Religions 
(ATR) alongside or within their affiliation with Christianity or Islam. A final aspect of the 
“world religions paradigm” is that it not only differentiates between religions but also between 
the religious and the secular. However, such a distinction between the religious and the secular is 
hard to find in highly religious contexts, and people might not think about what they do or what 
influences them as being “religious.” Instead, religion permeates all aspects of their lives rather 
than just being relevant to the private realm of religion and belief. 
We finish the paper with a series of policy recommendations that we hope will be helpful to 
governments and NGOs wishing to engage in this area. We note that there are some tensions 
between some of the recommendations and they may seem to point in different directions. 
However, it needs to be borne in mind not only that here are different types of faith actor (see 
Box 2), but that faith actors can wear different hats at different times (ie sometimes they should 
be treated just like other development actors, and at other times they may have something 
distinctive to offer or that needs to be considered because they are faith actors). Therefore, 
different recommendations will be relevant in different kinds of situations. 
Policy Recommendations 
Governments and NGOs should recognize that the category of “faith actor” is broader 
than just formal FBOs that have an international profile and are familiar with global 
development processes and discourses. In selecting who to partner with, a wider range of faith 
actors needs to be brought to the table beyond those who are typically already participating. 
Religious apex bodies, regional and national FBOs (including those that are small and informal) 
as well as local places of worship, their religious leaders and congregations all play an important 
role in social welfare and development within their communities and can also facilitate the 
implementation of the SDGs. 
Faith-actors should not be brought in solely as “religious voices” but as development 
partners like all others. This clearly emerges from our research. Often, local faith actors and 
FBOs do not want to be relegated to the “religion corner” nor is their goal in engaging with the 
SDGs simply to insert religious interests or perspectives. Instead they see themselves as part of 
the global development effort, operate through its language, and seek to gain further visibility as 
development actors. For politically marginalized religious communities, this is even more 
crucial, as the SDG process provides them with a way of increased participation and speaking 
back to government policy – not in order to further religious or doctrinal goals, but to ascertain 
the rights of their respective population. 
Identifying which faith actors to engage with according to their relative background and 
expertise, and on what issues, should be given careful consideration. While it is important to 
take the contribution of faith actors to development seriously, and to realize that religion is a 
human resource rather than an obstacle to development, religion or faith is not a panacea to solve 
development problems and can sometimes exacerbate inequality and conflict. There is a need to 
resist discourses that overstate and oversimplify the apparent advantages of FBOs. However, the 
SDGs can only be achieved if the widest range of partnerships and collaborations are encouraged 
and facilitated across all sectors and all levels of society. Faith actors are key to this since so 
many people who have the most to benefit from the SDGs live in the Global South where levels 
of religiosity are high and religious organisations are present in the most remote locations. In 
meeting the aim to “leave no one behind” faith actors can play important role in changing 
attitudes, in supporting those in need and in transforming their lives. 
Perceived tensions between certain SDG goals or targets and religious values should be 
approached by recognizing that faith-based development actors are important mediators 
for gaining a more specific understanding of such tensions. The discussion around real or 
perceived clashes between SDGs and religious communities tends to revolve around a rather 
general understanding of very complex issues. FBO representatives and other faith actors 
typically have a very good understanding of the breadth of doctrinal positions within their 
religion and the varieties of cultural obstacles or concerns. As such, they should not be seen as 
representatives of a particular doctrinal position or “difficulty,” but as experts in navigating a 
plural field of positions and cultural practices in the interest of implementing a particular SDG 
goal or target in a contextually sensitive and sustainable way.
In engaging with faith actors, governments and NGOs need to recognize that some areas 
are sensitive due to the impact of religious teachings and theologies. This includes debates 
over gender equality and LGBT rights. These issues are important to address so that the SDGs 
can be met, and recognizing that some areas are sensitive does not mean that they should be 
avoided or ignored. However, addressing them is likely to require time and space for dialogue, 
including gaining a sense of doctrinal diversity on this issue and seeking alliances with faith 
actors who are committed to equality in all areas. In this regard some FBOs are well positioned 
to play the role of broker or mediator between secular human rights goals and particularistic and 
conservative religious ideologies. Provided they are given the space to articulate, discuss, and 
help modify alternative moral and ethical visions, they can be key to facilitate changes in 
attitudes and practices in a way that they are not perceived as threats to tradition and identity. 
The considerable colonial baggage that is carried by modern global development institutions and 
fears over continued imperialistic domination can mean that some communities in the Global 
South are more likely to reject and fear calls for equality when it is seen to be promoted by 
Western institutions, including drawing attention to instances of perceived of double standards. 
Both the message and the means of deep and sustained social transformation needs to be owned 
by communities and faith actors can play an important role in this.
In building partnerships with faith actors, it is important that they are listened to and 
included on their terms rather than being instrumentalized to achieve pre-defined 
development goals. Some faith actors feel that their resources and capacity has been 
instrumentalized to serve a secular development agenda, without including the level of 
transformation and fundamental structural reform that their teachings and values, as well as 
experience, indicate are really necessary in order to reduce human suffering and inequality. Faith 
actors are not alone in making this kind of critique and there are a broad range of civil society 
actors who are suspicious that the SDGs are going to be incapable of achieving their ends as they 
do not adequately tackle the root of the problems faced by the poor. However, faith actors often 
feel that there is no space within global development discourse for them to be taken seriously in 
terms of the intangible aspects of their religion and the relevance of the relationship between the 
human and the divine, or in terms of teachings and practice that point beyond the ultimate 
significance of the material and social world. These aspects are hidden or reduced in their 
interaction with global development institutions and processes. Therefore, the “turn to religion” 
risks missing out what might be “distinctive” about the ways that religion shapes the things that 
people value in their lives and how this impacts on understandings of what counts as 
development and how to achieve it. While this kind of incorporation of religion is not 
appropriate to every development collaboration, and indeed many faith actors appreciate the 
existence of religious neutral discussion forums for development, investment in the creation of 
effective processes to accommodate the epistemological differences between secular and 
religious worldviews on development, including better dialogue between faith-based and 
development actors and their perspectives on desirable societal trajectories, could be beneficial 
in fostering closer collaboration.
Members of NGOs and governments should increase their religious literacy, not only in 
terms of the history, teachings and practices of different world religions, but also with 
respect to how religion actually manifests in diverse settings. Rather than viewing religion in 
the Global South in terms of the “world religions paradigm” alone, it is important to also 
consider the following three factors: First, the Western “world religions paradigm” tends to 
prioritize texts over lived religion and the role of religious leaders as official representatives of 
the populations they claim to represent. Such an approach in the Global South can lead to a poor 
understanding of religious dynamics. Second, the “world religions paradigm” tends to present 
religionists as belonging to only one, discrete religious tradition, when in many places the 
boundaries between religions are often not clear-cut, and people may practice or belong to more 
than one at the same time. Third, the “world religions paradigm” also not only assumes a clear 
distinction between religions, but also between the secular and the religious. In many settings in 
the Global South this is not a binary that reflects how people think about their religion and 
instead it permeates all aspects of their private, public and political lives. 
Box 1
The “turn to religion” by development studies, policy and practice – some important global 
initiatives
2000: World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) was the first major global 
initiative in this area, bringing together development actors, faith groups, and 
academics. It was set up by former World Bank president James Wolfensohn 
and then Archbishop of Canterbury Lord Carey of Clifton. In the early years 
WFDD worked closely with a World Bank unit, the (now defunct) 
Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics (DDVE), which led both policy 
analysis and research from within the World Bank.11 It is currently based in 
Washington, DC, at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs at 
Georgetown University carrying our research and publishing reports. 2002: The 
Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCI) was established at 
USAID “to create a level playing field for faith and community-based 
organizations to compete for USAID programs.”122005-2010: Religions and 
Development (RaD) Research Programme: DFID funded a large £3.5 million 
research programme based at the University of Birmingham. This carried our 
research in India, Pakistan, Tanzania and Nigeria, publishing dozens of papers 
and policy briefs.132007: UN-Interagency Task Force (UNIATF) on Religion 
and Development first came together informally (UNFPA 2015), and in 2009 
produced Guidelines for Engaging Faith-Based Organizations as Cultural 
Agents of Change (UNFPA 2009). It was formally approved in 2010. Other 
work includes producing reports on the UNIATF’s engagement with faith actors 
(2014; 2016). More recently this body, now known as the UN Interagency Task 
Force on Engaging Religion for Sustainable Development, has played a role in 
events and publications concerned with bringing faith actors into the new SDG 
process (UNFPA/Digni (2016b).
2012: The Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities (JLI) was 
founded, catalyzed by the UNIATF consultations, and with a commitment to “build 
our collective understanding of the potential of local faith communities for improving 
community health, development and well-being.”142014: World Bank Faith Initiative 
was a “revitalization” of World Bank Group “engagement with faith-based and 
religious organizations based on a recognition that they are often doing the essential 
work on the frontlines of combatting extreme poverty, protecting the vulnerable, 
delivering essential services, and alleviating suffering. The Faith Initiative team serves 
as a bridge for faith actors looking to engage with the World Bank Group and as a 
resource to better equip and support World Bank Group staff. The team collaborates 
with units across the Bank and works closely with the United Nation through the 
Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development to advance shared 
development priorities.”15 2015: The World Bank Group took leadership of a new 
initiative called “Ending Extreme Poverty: A Moral and Spiritual Imperative” 
involving a joint statement from religious leaders to end extreme poverty by 2030. 
This has included a conference held in Jun 2015 “Religion & Sustainable 
Development: Building Partnerships to End Extreme Poverty.”162016: International 
Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development (PaRD) established at the 
Berlin conference “Partners for Change – Religions and the 2030 Agenda” and ‘aims 
at greater and institutionalized communication and coordination between secular and 
non-secular actors, while fostering new synergies through cooperation of its members 
and partners’.17 Its secretariat is located in the offices of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
International Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Bonn and Berlin, Germany.
Box 2
Types of Faith Actor
The broad category of ‘faith actor’ extends beyond the formal faith-based organisations (FBOs) that are most visible  
within the global development world. We have identified the following types of faith actor:
 Large,  formal international  FBOs, typically with branches in the Global  South (e.g.  Christian Aid, 
Islamic Relief, Tearfund etc.). They often have strong links to the UN (e.g. special consultative status at  
ECOSOC) and other international processes.
 International  apex  bodies  representing  faith  traditions  (e.g.  Anglican  Communion,  Vatican,  World 
Council of Churches) with formal links to UN processes.
 Formal FBOs and networks, such as interreligious councils that have a national or regional reach, are 
frequently partners with government ministries and are usually located in national capitals. They may 
also have links to the UN and other international processes, including through their participation in 
worldwide religious networks.
 Smaller formal FBOs may have some transnational ties but are not necessarily linked to the UN or 
other international development organisations. They may be supported by religious centres in the West 
(e.g. churches, mosques, etc.) but any further international ties are unlikely.
 FBOs carrying out development and humanitarian work, which are small-scale and local, may be linked 
to  local  places  of worship,  and are less  likely to  have formal  links  to UN and other international  
processes. This could include parish committees or zakat committees. They have some organisational 
structure  within  their  religious  communities  but  they  are  not  necessarily  separate,  registered 
organisations.
 Religious leaders are increasingly invited to participate in global and national policy debates. This is  
due to the perception that, in the Global South, they often hold positions of authority and trust and they 
are revered and listened to. Faith leaders – that may have local, national and international levels of 
leadership – can be valuable allies in promoting the SDGs and other development values and goals.  
However, certain religious views and values may also present obstacles, making understanding and 
respectful engagement all the more important.
 Places of worship and their  congregations in the Global  South may also support  development and 
humanitarian work at a local level. Groups may spontaneously mobilise within such communities and 
at places of worship when there is a crisis.
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